2006-01-17 Joint Work SessionCity of Kodiak/Kodiak Island Borough
Joint Work Session Agenda
January 17, 2006, 7:30 p.m.
Borough Assembly Chambers
Joint work sessions are informal meetings of the City Council and Borough Assembly where
elected officials discuss issues that affect both City and Borough govemments and residents.
Although additional items not listed on the joint work session agenda are sometimes discussed
when introduced by elected officials, staff, or members of the public, no formal action is taken
at joint work sessions and items that require formal action are placed on a regular City Council
and /or Borough Assembly meeting agenda.
1. Public Comments
2. Creation of Joint Ad Hoc Kodiak Gulf of Alaska Rationalization Task Force 1
3. Review of City and Borough Capital Improvement Project Resolutions 25
4. Select Date for Elected and Appointed Officials Emergency Management Exercise
(February 7 or 14, 6 to 9 p.m) 38
5. Certified Local Government Program for Historic Preservation 41
Suggested Members
Bonney, Julie
Branson, Steve
Fields, Duncan
Kavanaugh, Julie/Ron
Kozak, Linda
Moir, Matt
Peterson, Theresa
Ranney, Cecil
Saravia, Gabriel
Stephan, Jeff
Sullivan, Joe
Stinson, Jay
Whiddon, John
NOTES/TIMELINE•
Kodiak - Gulf of Alaska Rationalization Task Force
By Mayors Floyd and Selby Suggested Facilitator
Norm Wooten
**Discuss Creation of the Task Force at a Joint City Council/Borough Assembly Work Session on
January 17
**Task Force members appointed by resolution at the January 26 meeting of the City Council and the
January 22 " or February 2 "d meeting of the Borough Assembly.
* *February 6 — NPFMC meets in Seattle
* *Committee works throughout February and March 2006 and provides a status update to the City
Council and Borough Assembly at a joint work session in late March.
* *April 3` - NPFMC meets in Anchorage
* *Committee works throughout April and May 2006 and provides a status update to the City Council
and Borough Assembly at a joint work session in mid -May with recommendations for presentation to
the NPFMC at their June meeting.
**June 5 NPFMC meets in Kodiak (future NPFMC meetings include: October 2 — Dutch Harbor
and December 4 Anchorage)
Oliver Holm January 4, 2006
PO Box 3865 486 -6957
Kodiak, Alaska 99615 chicken @gci.net
Mayor Carolyn Floyd
City of Kodiak
4
JAN as
Received
C ty 4!erk's Office
Lit;, ni Kodiak
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Dear Mayor Floyd;
The Kodiak Fish and Game Advisory Committee discussed Gulf groundfish
rationalization at our meeting in December. We were informed of the
possibility that a community task force might be put together to bring a
proposal to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council that would be
better for Kodiak Island communities than the alternatives currently being
considered by the NPFMC.
The committee has instructed me to request that a member of the Advisory
Committee be seated on any group that is formed. While there are some
members of the advisory committee that might be considered for a task
force as representatives of various interest groups in groundfish, the
Committee would like to be represented by a person knowledgable about
fisheries management and the impacts to our community but who would not
have to simultaneausly represent one of the groups already involved at the
NPFMC.
At our January third meeting the Kodiak Advisory Committee voted to
advance my name for the seat with committee members Roland Ruoss and
Donna Jones as alternates. Since a timeline for the work of the as yet
unformed task force is not known, we thought that we should include
alternates. I will be fishing tanner crab for probably a couple weeks in the
last half of January.
I understand that the City Council will discuss this fairly soon. I thank you
and the Council for consideration of our request.
Sincerely; 7/4-\
Oliver Holm
Chair
Kodiak Fish and Game Advisory Committee
Freed, Linda
From: Donna Jones [donnajones4444 @yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 07, 2006 7:58 PM
To: Freed, Linda
Subject: GOA Groundfish Task Force
Page 1 of 1
Linda,
I am officially submitting a request for Theresa Peterson to be a member on the GOA Groundfish Task
Force. She is in Mexico and is not able to respond herself. I spoke with her yesterday and she requested
I send this. She will return in a couple of days. She is a fishermen, sits on the fish and game advisory
committee and is also a coordinator for AMCC (alaska marine conservation council She would be an
excellent choice as she is very involved and knowledgeable. If you have any questions, please feel free
to call me. Thanks, Donna 486 -5525.
Yahoo! DSL Something to write home about. Just $16.99/mo. or less
1/8/2006
January 9, 2006
Donna L. Jones
1524 Ismailov St.
Kodiak, AK 99615
(907) 486 -5525
t
17410;a/10o
nYfLtl C)1ZL':4'y � -r - . coin
Dear Linda Freed,
I would like to submit my name as a possible candidate for the GOA Ground fish
Task Force. I have been involved in the fishing industry on many levels and
believe that my experience will be an asset to this position. Over the last 10 years
1 have been actively involved in the Salmon, Ground fish and Shell fish fisheries
on all levels including Federal, State and Regionally.
My experience within the fishing industry has been quite diverse. It started over
ten years ago when I Shrimp fished in Southeast Alaska on a Kodiak based pot
boat. Having the past experience as a fisherman has brought great insight to my
understanding of the industry. I also have two years experience as past General
Manager, Fleet Manager and Director of Business Development of a local
seafood processing plant, Global Seafoods North America LLC. Just recently I
completed a grant funded position through the Borough and Chamber of
Commerce as the Program Director and Certified Seafood Inspector for the Star
of Kodiak Quality Assurance Program. I reported to the Kodiak Branding and
Marketing Board and enjoyed this position immensely.
I am currently active within many areas of concern within the fishing industry-in
particular areas that have to do with the long -term social and economic stability
and preservation of our coastal communities and the long -term sustainability of
our fisheries. Over the last year 1 have been an active Board member on the State
of Alaska, Fish and Game Advisory Committee and am the Chairman of the State
Waters Ground fish sub - committee. Most recently I was appointed as a Board of
Director to the joint City/Boroughs Kodiak Island Fishery Association. I attend
other meetings and conferences that involve our fishing industry such as the
Managing Fisheries - Empowering Communities conference. I also speak at and
attend most Federal North Pacific Fishery Management Council Meetings. I have
researched and analyzed many different aspects of our fishing industry and am up
to date on issues including Gulf Rationalization and Salmon Restructuring.
1 have a great passion for this industry and its participants and would be honored
to have the opportunity to work on this hoard fnr the betterment nf c oastal
community. Again thank you for this opportunity, I look forward to your reply.
Sincerely
Donna Jones
Freed, Linda
From: Donna Jones [donnajones4444 @yahoo.com]
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2006 10:24 AM
To: Freed, Linda
Subject: GOA Task Force
Page 1 of 1
Linda,
Please submit the name of Steve Branson to the GOA Task Force. He is coming down to see you and we
did not understand that the submission needed to be written. So I am submitting his name knowing that
he is wanting to be on it. He is the president of the crewmembers association. Thanks, Donna
Yahoo! DSL Something to write home about. Just $16.99/mo. or less
1/9/2006
DRAFT
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF KODIAK (KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH)
APPOINTING A GULF OF ALASKA GROUNDFISH RATIONALIZATION TASK FORCE
WHEREAS, the harvesting and processing sectors of the Kodiak fishing community are engaged in
and substantially dependent upon the Gulf of Alaska (Gulf) groundfish fisheries; and
WHEREAS, Kodiak's economic and social health is intimately dependent upon the community's
sustained participation in all aspects of Gulf groundfish fisheries; and
WHEREAS, the City of Kodiak has made substantial infrastructure investments in support of and in
reliance upon the Gulf groundfish fishery, such as water system expansion and improvement and port
and harbor expansion and improvement; and
WHEREAS, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council has developed a suite of fishery allocation
alternatives for the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries, and is working toward adoption of a preferred
alternative for implementation; and
WHEREAS, allocating exclusive harvesting and/or processing privileges promotes consolidation in the
fishing fleet and the processor sector, which can improve efficiency, but can also result in skippers,
crew members and processing workers bearing the costs of consolidation without fully sharing in the
related benefits; and
WHEREAS, while rationalization can create opportunities and incentives to produce more and higher
value products, it can also change the distribution of fishery revenues among participants by altering
the balance of market power between fishermen and processors, with potentially disruptive effects on
the communities in which they live; and
WHEREAS, by awarding harvesting and/or processing privileges, fishery allocations make possible
orderly harvesting and processing, but can also facilitate the migration of landings to communities with
infrastructure advantages (such as road system access) and create barriers to entry for later generations
of fishery participants; and
WHEREAS, it is essential that the potential adverse affects of Gulf groundfish rationalization be
identified and analyzed, and that adjustments be made to mitigate the potential adverse effects of Gulf
groundfish rationalization on Kodiak prior to implementation; and
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of the City of Kodiak and the Kodiak Island Borough to facilitate a
full, and frank exchange of information and opinions concerning Gulf groundfish rationalization
among the constituencies of the community that will be most directly affected by such program, if
adopted, and to facilitate, to the extent possible, development of consensus among those constituencies
concerning the preferred elements and options of such program.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF KODIAK
(ASSMEBLY OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH) THAT the following individuals are
appointed to a City of Kodiak/Kodiak island Borough Gulf groundfish rationalization task force, and
these individuals are hereby respectfully requested to accept such appointment:
IDENTIFY AND ADD NAMES
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT:
(1) Such appointees serve on the task force at the pleasure of the City Council/Kodiak Island Borough
Assembly, and that any member may be removed at any time, or the entire task force may be
disbanded at any time, as the City Council/Borough Assembly deem appropriate in their sole
discretion; and
(2) That appointment to the Ad Hoc Kodiak Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization task force
provides no specific rights or authorities other than to make recommendations to the City
Council/Borough Assembly concerning Gulf of Alaska groundfish rationalization from time to time,
which the City Council/Borough Assembly may accept or reject in their sole discretion; and
(3) That appointment to the task force is conditioned on the appointees acknowledging and agreeing
that service on such Gulf groundfish rationalization task force is voluntary and without any
compensation.
GOA Groundfish
Rationalization
At the December 2005 meeting, the Council received four
reports from staff. The first report reviewed a discussion paper
on the two community programs proposed under GOA
groundfish rationalization: the Community Fisheries Quota
(CFQ) Program and the Community Purchase Program (CPP).
The paper outlined ongoing legal concerns with the CFQ
Program and provided preliminary data on fisheries
participation by potentially eligible communities. The second
report reviewed a preliminary analysis of alternatives,
preliminary catch data analyses, and preliminary analyses of
elements and options under consideration. These analyses are
intended to assist the Council in developing and refining
alternatives for regulatory analysis. The third report reviewed
available information on species under consideration for
bycatch reduction measures by the Council, including the draft
bycatch alternatives last modified in June 2005. The fourth
report examined potential systems for the collection of detailed
crew participation data.
In response to public testimony and staff reports, the Council
modified several components of the alternatives under
consideration. The Council modified the community program
options to: require that the harvesting of shares under the
purchase program is limited to eligible community residents;
clarify that the groundfish fisheries participation criteria in the
community eligibility options is in the WG, CG, and WY areas;
and provide requirements to qualify an administrative entity
under the CPP. The Council also requested that subsequent
community fisheries participation tables indicate the number of
landings made by residents. Staff contact is Nicole Kimball.
Based on Advisory Panel suggestion, the Council also directed
staff to reformat the Council's overall motion describing
elements and options from which the alternatives are defined,
so that each sector is treated distinctively. This reformatting is
intended to make the motion more accessible to stakeholders
wishing to compare the alternatives and to facilitate further
refinement of the alternatives by the Council.
In addition, the Council also modified options in its overall
motion. The Council added options to Alternative 3 (similar to
those already contained in Alternative 2) that would cap the
amount of quota that could be used on a vessel and limit leasing
within cooperatives to constrain consolidation under the
program. The Council also modified the provisions in both
alternatives that define qualifying years used to determine
eligibility for processing protections.
The Council also reiterated its intention to consider bycatch
reduction measures (under the GOA groundfish rationalization
initiative) for the following species: Chinook salmon, `other'
salmon, Tanner crab, red king crab. The Council requested that
updated spatial data on the bycatch of these species be included
in a subsequent analysis. A meeting date for further Council
review of data and an analysis on bycatch reduction measures
has not yet been determined: however other aspects of the
overall program will be discussed at the February 2006
Council meeting. Staff contact is Diana Stram.
The Council also directed staff to work with industry in the
development of options to address crew interests under
program. Staff contact on crew provisions is Rachel Baker
from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and Mark
Fina, Council staff, who will be working on the overall
program in addition to crew provisions.
Right Whale
Critical Habitat
North Pacific Fishery Management Council, December 2005
7
The Council received a report from NMFS on the Proposed
Rule to designate two areas in the North Pacific as Critical
Habitat (CH) for the northern right whale. One CH area is
located in the southeastern Bering Sea (35,630 sq mi) and
another in the Gulf of Alaska south of Kodiak Island (1,170
sq mi). NMFS reported that the CH designations are based
on a Primary Constituent Elements analysis of areas where
dense concentrations of copepod are believed to occur. The
Federal Register notice, maps of the two CH areas, and
other information is available at
http://www.fakr.noaa.eovinrotecteclresourceslwhalesinricial
rule /default.hun The Council also received a discussion
paper from staff that summarizes the nature of Council -
managed fisheries that occur in these CH areas; the
document provided socioeconomic data on fisheries
including species, gear types, locations, seasons. and values
for harvesting, processing, and communities.
During public comment, representatives of the North Pacific
groundfish fishery reported on a joint initiative between
industry and NMFS to produce a laminated sheet as an aid
to right whale identification with advice on appropriate
action to take if a right whale is encountered. These mariner
advisory placards are being distributed to the fleet. More
information is available from the Marine Conservation
Alliance and the National Marine Mammal Laboratory.
The Council decided to submit comments to NMFS on the
Proposed Rule including a summary of the amount of
groundfish, crab, and halibut harvested from the two CH
areas and the estimated economic value of these harvests.
While none of these fisheries would likely adversely impact
the Primary Constituent Elements of CH, that is the copepod
concentrations upon which northern right whales feed, the
Council wishes to stress the importance of the fisheries that
occur m these areas. The Council's SSC also provided
comments on the Proposed Rule and are included in the
Council's comments. The letter to NMFS will be posted on
the Council's web site. Staff contact is Bill Wilson.
I. Background.
A. Why rationalize?
Gulf Groundfish Rationalization:
Issues and Options
January 8, 2006
At its simplest, "rationalization" is an allocation of the right to participate in a
fishery under which each qualified participant receives individual shares or quotas. As a
public policy matter, it is done in the interest of improving efficiency and facilitating
sustained yield management.
Rationalization improves efficiency by providing a mechanism to reduce
harvesting capacity employed in a fishery. Under traditional rationalization models,
when fishery shares are allocated, more efficient harvesters acquire shares from less
efficient harvesters, until the optimum amount of effort is employed or a governmental
consolidation limit is reached.
Rationalization also improves efficiency by eliminating competition for catch
among harvesters. By doing so, it frees harvesters and processors to coordinate their
activities, and to concentrate on producing high value products rather than racing for fish.
Rationalization facilitates sustained yield management by shifting the primary
responsibility for complying with seasonal harvest limits from fishery managers, who
must estimate harvest rates and project season closures accordingly, to harvesters, who
must limit their catch to the amount of their quota. Rationalization also reduces the
amount of gear employed in a fishery, resulting in less incidental mortality and less
impact on sensitive habitat. In addition, rationalization provides fishery share holders
with a vested interest in the rationalized fishery resource, which in turn provides them
with an incentive to promote the long term health of the resource, rather than its short
term value.
B. Why is efficiency important?
Seafood is produced and marketed on a global basis. Consumers are able to
purchase seafood products from producers who have labor cost advantages, production
cost advantages (fish farms, for example) or governmental subsidies. Under these
circumstances, seafood production inefficienriec rem in le market shares Lost
market shares result in less revenue for harvesters and processors, with corresponding
impacts on fishing community economies.
The evolution of the salmon market is a classic case in point. The Alaska limited
entry salmon fishery had a number of inherent inefficiencies. Farmed salmon producers
recognized the opportunity those inefficiencies represented, and captured a large share of
the salmon market by producing their products much more efficiently. In reaction,
Alaska salmon producers were forced to reduce prices and develop new market niches
and product forms. While there has been some recovery, the resulting restructuring is
still having significant impacts on Alaskan communities.
This is not to say the most efficient system is necessarily the best system.
Efficiency must be balanced against other social values, such as environmental
considerations, health and quality of life standards, and cultural choices. Alaskan salmon
producers have confirmed that some consumers will pay a higher price for a product that
is produced from fish that develop at sea instead of in pens, are produced without
antibiotics or growth hormones, and are caught by small, family -owned operations.
However, there is a limited market for higher cost products, and to that extent, efficiency
must be a constant consideration.
C. Allocation vs. privatization.
Allocating fisheries shares is an essential element of rationalization. It makes
reducing capacity, ending the race for fish and more effective fishery management
possible. However, much of the resistance to rationalization stems from the related
conversion of a public pool resource into private property, which is then awarded to the
first generation to receive fishery shares. There are several reasons this aspect of
rationalization is troubling. The public does not receive value in return for its resource.
The first generation receives a windfall, while all further generations pay to enter. The
cost associated buying fishery shares is a barrier to entry for those who does not have
access to a significant amount of capital If shares can be leased, it becomes possible for
passive share holders to extract rent from fishery participants, which reduces the fishery
revenues that flow through active participants (such as skippers and crew members) into
the communities where they live. All of these considerations lead to the obvious question
— is it necessary to privatize a fishery in order to rationalize it ?'
The extent to which a public resource is converted to private property through
fishery share allocation depends entirely on the type of fishery share that is created The
classic analysis of the character of any type of "property" evaluates it from several
different angles. How exclusive is the use right? How long does it last? Is it
transferable? What must be done to maintain the use right? Specifically, must
"property" be used to remain property?
How important is each of these characteristics to achieving the benefits of
rationalization? If we are trying to end the race for fish, exclusivity is very important — a
The Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act stipulates that fishery shares are
"privileges ", rather than property, and may be modified or extinguished at any time without the holder
being entitled to any compensation. However, in practice, when fishery shares are issued, a market
develops immediately, and investments are made in reliance on those shares remaining more or less the
same in character for some reasonable period of time. Unless limits on the "property" characteristics are
imposed at initial allocation, it may not be politically feasible to restructure a share allocation system
without providing significant advance notice to the market, and allowing those who have purchased shares
to amortize their investment before the character of those purchased shares is changed.
- /
2
harvester who receives a fishery share must know that the related amount of fish are his
or hers alone to harvest, if he or she is going to fish at a slow pace or stand down until
market timing is optimal
Duration is important, as it determines the extent to which a harvester can rely on
the system to support the investments necessary to enter or remain in the fishery. A
harvester who is deciding whether to invest in a vessel and gear must make an educated
guess about a number of factors that will affect the success or failure of his or her
operation. Among them, a very important factor is the amount of fish that he or she will
be able to harvest each year. In the absence of rationalization, a harvester can project
catch by evaluating the strength of the fish stocks and the likely increase in total fishing
effort over the life of his or her vessel and gear, and evaluating his or her competitive
capacity relative to the rest of the fleet.
On the other hand, in a rationalized fishery, aside from fish stock fluctuations, a
harvester will have a much higher degree of certainty regarding the amount of fish
available to him or her, for the duration of the allocation. If the allocation has a duration
that is equal to or greater than the period of time over which a harvester can reasonably
project the number of other participants in the fishery and their relative catching capacity,
it should be adequate to support a decision whether or not to invest in entering the
fishery. What is that period of time? Ask several harvesters, you will get several
answers. The general range seems to fall between 5 and 15 years.
Transferability seems important, because one of the ways in which rationalization
promotes efficiency is through consolidation. Consolidation is generally expected to take
place through the fishery quota market, as more efficient harvesters acquire fishery shares
through leases or purchases, subject to governmental limits on fishery share holdings.
However, consolidation can be achieved through means other than allowing market
transfers among participants. One approach is to use the governmental fishery share
allocation process itself to achieve the desired level of consolidation, i.e., as part of the
allocation process, decide how many participants the fishery will support, and allocate
fishery shares among that number of participants. Transfers would not be necessary to
achieve consolidation, and could even be prohibited. However, this is an "all or nothing"
result among the participants — they are either in or out, and those who are below the cut-
off line receive nothing
Another approach would be to allow consolidation to happen through attrition
rather than transfers. Under this approach, fishery shares would be allocated among all of
the harvesters who participated during some base period, pro rata according to their
relative harvest shares during that period. As long as a harvester continues to participate
in the fishery, he or she maintains his or her fishery share On the other hand, if a
harvester fails to use some or all of his or her fishery share for some period of time (for
example, two consecutive years) the unused fishery share lapses into the share pool, and
is divided among the remaining active participants in the following year. Share
consolidation under this model could be limited by setting a use cap that could not be
exceed by any single harvester and/or by setting a minimum number of participants, and
allocating to new entrants when that limit is reached.
Does rationalization require that a harvester remain active in the fishery, or, in the
alternative, does rationalization require that a harvester be able to sell or lease his or her
fishery shares for value, and exit the fishery? It appears neither option is necessary to
obtain the basic benefits of rationalization. Rather, these are policy choices, which have
much more to do with questions of what is fair, both to the harvesters who receive an
additional allocation, and to everyone else who in one way or another depends on the
fishery, directly or indirectly, for their livelihood.
From the point of view of the harvesters in line to receive an initial allocation, the
best result is one which provides them with the maximum value and flexibility. For
them, a freely marketable share, which can be leased or sold to whomever they choose,
on whatever terms they choose, is best. On the other hand, the more freely marketable
their fishery shares are, the more that the value of the fishery that those shares represent
is transferred to the first generation. In other words, the extent to which fishery shares
allocated to the first generation are freely marketable determines the extent to which
rationalization equates to privatization.
From the perspective of the harvester who stands to receive fishery shares,
privatization is a fair and appropriate result. The arguments they most often make in
support of marketable shares are that they took personal risks, financial and otherwise, to
develop the fishery and thus deserve the reward associated with rationalizing it, and that
because prior rationalization systems have awarded the value of fishery shares to the
initial share recipients, it would be unfair not to follow the same precedent going forward.
While each of these arguments has some basis, there is another perspective.
Harvesters who have developed a fishery have received income from it while they
were doing so, and arguably, their rate of return on investment must have been adequate,
or they would have sold out and found another investment opportunity. If their argument
is that they have been fishing at an otherwise unacceptable return on investment in
anticipation of rationalization, a reasonable response is that they have been doing so on
speculation, as they had no guaranties that rationalization would be implemented, or how
marketable their fishery shares would be if and when they were issued.
Even if we believe that harvesters who are "vested" in a fishery at the time it is
rationalized merit special consideration, it can be argued that receiving the right to the
income stream associated with rationalized fishery shares for as long as they continue to
participate is adequate reward for the risks they tnnk in developing and participatin i
the pre - rationalization fishery. For harvesters to receive a share of the capital value of the
fishery in addition (which, for purposes of this paper, is considered to be the discounted
net present value of the income stream that their shares will generate after they have
exited the fishery) is arguably a windfall which no one has a right to expect, at Least not
without paying for it.
The assertion that because others have received transferable shares for other
rationalized fisheries, it would be unfair to award something less in connection with
future rationalization systems, is fundamentally inconsistent with the notion that we must
be open minded and adaptive in developing each new rationalization program. These
programs are relatively new innovations, are tremendously complicated, and have
unpredictable effects. We must have the capability to learn from our mistakes, and
restructure each generation of rationalization based on what we have learned. It is true
that diluting the character of the quasi- property right that fishery shares represent could
place those who receive weaker property rights at a competitive disadvantage relative to
those who hold the stronger property rights. However, if the result of doing so is truly
inequitable, it may be a better argument for revisiting the prior programs that have been
adopted and changing their rules, than it is for carrying a flawed set of rules forward.
This entire discussion regarding what, if any, of the characteristics of "property"
are essential to achieving the benefits of rationalization begs another question — who
should receive these rights? The Federal model to date has been to award fishery shares
to vessel owners, on the theory (related to some of the arguments above) that they have
made the capital investment in the fishery. However, there is a growing recognition that
a whole host of others directly or indirectly depend on fisheries for their livelihood, and
their interests are directly affected when fisheries are rationalized. That class includes
those directly involved (such as non -owner skippers, crew members and processors) as
well as parties who are indirectly involved (such as communities, which include goods
and service providers, as well as municipal or regional governments themselves). How
does rationalization impact them, and what can be done about it?
Answering that question may enable us to do a better job of answering whether,
and to what extent, it is appropriate to grant quasi- property rights through the allocation
of fishery shares, and if so, who should receive them.
D. Skippers, crew members, processors and communities.
1. Skippers and crew members. It may seem ironic to say so in light of
the effects of the Bering Sea crab rationalization program, but rationalization has often
been considered a potential benefit to skippers and crew members, even if fishery shares
are issued to vessel owners. The basis for this assertion is that while consolidation results
in fewer skipper and crew positions, the positions that remain should be more highly
compensated, as a rationalized fishery produces more products and higher value products
than those produced under a race for fish, that some portion of this increased value should
pass through in the form of higher vessel revenues, and higher vessel revenues should
result in higher skipper and crew shares.
However, this argument does not account for the the disruption to the lives of
those who lose their jobs in the process of consolidation. Further, if consolidation is
achieved through fishery share leases or purchases, and those costs are deducted from a
vessel's gross revenues prior to skipper and crew shares being calculated, for the skippers
5
and crew members who remain employed, any increase in overall fishery value generated
by rationalization may be offset, and perhaps even more than offset, by those deductions.
The loss of skipper and crew positions employment opportunities resulting from
rationalization could be addressed by setting vessel use caps, which limit the amount of
consolidation that can take place within the affected fleet. However, setting vessel caps
purely for the purpose of maintaining skipper and crew employment is an artificial
inefficiency which, if it makes the products from the fishery less competitive, may
actually have the opposite result of that intended; in other words, it may cause the fishery
products produced under the vessel caps to be artificially over priced, which may cause
consumers to seek substitutes, which in turn may actually result in more jobs being lost
than if the fleet had been allowed to consolidate to an appropriate, efficient amount of
capacity in the first place.
Taking this a step further, it appears that from a social impact perspective, a factor
that may be almost as important as the raw loss of employment positions is the pace at
which they are eliminated, and the opportunities (or lack thereof) for skippers and crew
members to anticipate that change and adapt to it. If consolidation takes place over a
number of fishing seasons, and skippers and crew members have time to prepare for job
losses and make alternative employment arrangements, and perhaps even have some
assistance in making those transitions, the impact of rationalization is likely to be far less
disruptive than if consolidation takes place quickly, and jobs are lost with little advance
warning. One method for addressing this issue would be to control the rate of
consolidation by imposing a vessel use cap (i.e., percentage of the fishery resource that
may be harvested by any single vessel in any single year) in the first year that is fairly
restrictive, and then increasing that cap over time.
The second issue is more difficult to address. It would be extremely difficult to
monitor and enforce measures to insure that skipper and crew incomes are not affected by
quota purchases or leases, as it would involve governmental supervision of the related
contractual employment arrangements, and require audits of vessel revenues and
expenses to insure such costs were not inappropriately deducted. The only effective
method for preventing skippers and crew from incurring a share of these costs may be to
structure a rationalization program such that there is no cost associated with acquiring
fishery shares, and thus no basis for making a deduction from vessel revenues in
connection with acquiring them.
Another issue that is commonly raised is whether it is equitable for vessel owners
alone to be awarded fishery shares, or whether it is fairer to include skippers and crew
members in any such allocation. Vessel owners assert that because skippers and crew
members do not have capital invested in the fishery, it would be unfair for them to
receive fishery shares. Skippers and crew members argue that because fishery shares are
a windfall allocation of an otherwise public resource, it is arbitrary and unfair not to
recognize the reliance interest of skippers and crew members when shares are allocated.
As with most debates concerning faimess and equity, there is no clear right answer on
this issue. Perhaps the decision whether to do so could be based on the character of the
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6
quasi- property right represented by fishery shares. If fishery shares have strong property
characteristics (for example, if they can be sold or leased for value) it may be reasonable
to allocate some of them to skippers and crew members. If, on the other hand, they have
weak property characteristics (for example, are non - transferable), it may be less
reasonable to do so.
2. Processors. Processors stand to benefit from rationalization in much
the same way that harvesters do. A rationalized fishery allows processors to reduce the
capacity they employ to produce fishery products (as deliveries to plants should be made
over a more extended period of time, rather than in pulses) and (assuming harvesters
cooperate) provides processors with the flexibility to schedule deliveries for optimum use
of processing capacity and optimum product value, and increase profitability accordingly.
For these reasons, processors typically support rationalization.
However, since implementation of the halibut and sablefish IFQ program,
processors have conditioned their support for rationalization on inclusion of processor
benefits or protections. They provide several reasons for their position. They following
are some, if not all, of those reasons, and are presented in no particular order.
Processors assert that giving harvesters fishery shares provides harvesters with
increased leverage in ex- vessel price negotiations, effectively enabling harvesters to
capture all of the "rent" (i.e., the revenues in excess of costs of production, including
overhead costs, and a reasonable return on invested capital) associated with the fishery,
that this is an unfair result. Processors therefore demand some form of fishery allocation
or other market protection to counter - balance harvesters' increased leverage. However,
harvesters argue that processors' negotiating leverage is unduly enhanced by the
progressive increase in harvesting capacity, and the progressively more aggressive
competition among harvesters for ex- vessel markets, that precedes rationalization, and by
the large scale consolidation that has already taken place in the seafood processing sector.
From the harvesters' perspective, rationalization returns ex- vessel price negotiating
leverage to some semblance of an appropriate balance, rather than skewing it in favor of
harvesters.
Processors assert that they have made capital investments in plants and equipment
based the concentrated, pulse deliveries associated with a race for fish, and that some
portion of those investments is "stranded" when rationalization is implemented, and
deliveries are spread over a longer period of time. At its simplest, this assertion is
difficult to accept, as it assumes the stranded processing capacity was specific to the
pulse fishery that is being rationalized, and it is seldom that is clearly the case, as it is
difficult at best to allocate the capital investment in a multi - purpose plant a the
different species that it processes.
However, the "stranded capital" assertion has more merit if examined on a more
nuanced basis One legitimate basis for concern regarding the potential for "stranded
capital" is related to potential changes in delivery patterns following rationalization.
Under the pre - rationalization race for fish, there is a value in having processing
7
infrastructure located in close proximity to the fishing grounds, as time is of the essence
in making deliveries and being able to return to the grounds (assuming the fishery will
support more than one trip per boat). Post - rationalization, proximity to the fishing
grounds is not nearly as important, as harvesters are no longer competing for fishery
shares. As a result, rationalization makes it possible for processors that are further from
the fishing grounds, but that have infrastructure advantages such as road system access
and lower labor and utility costs, to compete for landings when they could not before. A
processor with infrastructure advantages sufficient to offset the extra costs a harvester
assumes by transporting product to that processor will be able to attract landings that it
would not have been able to obtain prior to rationalization. This change in circumstances
effectively reduces the value of the capital investment made by processors who located
plants based on pre - rationalization landing patterns.
Under these circumstances, it may be reasonable to impose a regional landing
requirement that preserves traditional landing patterns. However, it is important to
recognize that a regional landing requirement artificially raises the cost of processing,
and consequently may reduce the ex- vessel value of the product delivered, and/or
increase the price of the products produced by processors benefiting from the protection
of regionalization.
Another basis for carefully evaluating the effect of rationalization on processing
capacity has to do with the fact that pulse deliveries result in high instantaneous demands
for processing capacity, which creates an opportunity for processors to obtain or retain
market share that would not otherwise exist. Spreading the deliveries out over time
through rationalization effectively produces excess processing capacity, which enables
processors that are well capitalized and willing to enter into aggressive competition an
opportunity to take market share from other processors. If by doing so a processor can
eliminate one or more competitors, it may then be able to actually reduce the ex- vessel
prices it bids for deliveries to a share of product value that is lower than it was paying
pre - rationalization. Unless there are barriers to processor entry, the aggressive
processor's ability to reduce prices is constrained, because if it reduces them to the point
where a competitor could pay a higher price and still make a reasonable rate of return, the
competitor has an incentive to re -enter the market. However, if the aggressive processor
signals it is willing to repeat the aggressive competition cycle, it may be able to maintain
artificially lower ex- vessel prices without threat of competition, because of the
mobilization and opportunity costs associated with entering the processing market.
This problem could potentially be addressed by imposing a cap on processor
market share that would be lower than that otherwise applicable under general antitrust
law. impncing a market sharp cap may also protect i or non
' , ____ _., " - . "- " » t ...a..� also y .vwv. inefficient or non-
competitive processors from losing market share as the result of healthy competition, and
thus may actually depress ex- vessel prices. A careful evaluation of these competing
considerations would be necessary to actually set a processing market share cap that
would be more pro - competitive than anti - competitive.
8
Processors assert that it is fundamentally unfair to allocate fishery shares to
harvesters and not include processors in the allocation, as both have capital invested in
the fishery (in contrast, for example, to skippers and crew). It is a political policy choice
whether to give this faimess argument any validity. Whether to do so should depend on
the character of the quasi- property right represented by fishery shares. If fishery shares
have strong property characteristics (for example, if they can be sold or leased for value)
it may be reasonable to allocate some of them to processors. If, on the other hand, they
have weak property characteristics (for example, are non - transferable), it may be less
reasonable to do so.
In any case, if the decision is made to allocate shares to processors, how it is done
is of critical importance. Processor shares (i.e., allocations of the right to receive and
process fish) eliminate all incentives for price competition among processors for the
deliveries subject to processor share allocation, and artificially depress the ex- vessel
value of those deliveries. To avoid this problem, it is far more appropriate to consider
allocating some portion of harvesting rights to processors than it is to consider allocating
the processing market.
3. Communities. Harvesters and processors sometimes question the
standing of fisheries communities, as unique entities, to assert an interest in the fishery
share allocation process. It is important to note that National Standard 8 of the
Magnuson- Stevens Act provides that fishery conservation and management measures
shall take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in
order to provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and, to the extent
practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities. The terms
"sustained participation" mean continued access to the fishery within the constraints of
the condition of the resource.
For purposes of National Standard 8, the term "fishing community" means a
community that is substantially dependent on or substantially engaged in the harvest or
processing of fishery resources to meet social and economic needs, and includes (but is
not limited to) fishing vessel owners, skippers, crew members and processors based in
such communities. Under National Standard 8, a fishing community must be a social or
economic unit whose members reside in a specific location and share a common
dependency on commercial, recreational or subsistence fishing or on directly related
fisheries- dependent services and industries.
The National Standard 8 Guidelines issued by the National Marine Fisheries
Service state "all other things being equal, where two [fishery management] alternatives
achieve similar conservation goals, the alternative that provides t e g1 cam' potential for
sustained participation of fishing communities and minimizes the adverse impacts on
such communities would be the preferred alternative."
National Standard 8 not only validates, but mandates, specifically considering the
interests of affected fishing communities in connection with any proposed rationalization
program. What is an appropriate set of criteria for doing so?
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9
A very strong argument can be made that the sustained health of a fishing
community depends on its harvesters and processors remaining efficient and competitive
in a global seafood market. As we have seen with the restructuring of the salmon market,
maintaining artificial inefficiencies in seafood product production leaves the communities
that depend on the resource at risk that more efficient producers will capture market
share, displace the community's harvesters and processors, and cause significant, even
severe economic impacts on the affected communities. From this perspective,
rationalization itself is a potential benefit, and perhaps even essential, to communities that
depend on fisheries that could be made more efficient through fishery share allocation.
On the other hand, all rationalization programs restructure the relationships
among vessel owners, skippers, crew members and processors, and in doing so may cause
significant disruption to a community in the short term. Further, rationalization
alternatives that permit fishery share recipients to lease or sell their fishery shares may
result in transfers of fishing- related revenues from active fishery participants residing in
fishing communities to inactive share holders who reside elsewhere, and rationalization
alternatives that include inadequate or overly burdensome processor protection
mechanisms may have anti - competitive market impacts that offset, or even more than
offset, the efficiency benefits of rationalization for the affected communities. Such
alternatives could have severe adverse economic effects on fishing communities over the
long term.
In addition to considering the effects of rationalization within any affected fishing
community, it is important to also consider the potential disparate effects of
rationalization among different fishing communities. The same points that were made
concerning the potential for rationalization programs to "strand capital" of processors
who placed plants in close proximity to the fishing grounds under the race for fish apply
at the community level. Cities such as Kodiak, which are located in close proximity to
Gulf groundfish fishing grounds, but that have infrastructure disadvantages relative to
communities on the road system, are at risk of having the investments made in
infrastructure to support the fishing industry become far less valuable if it becomes
practical to run groundfish catch to the road system after rationalization. Further,
migration of landings could result in personal income losses, lower tax revenues and
population declines for the communities with infrastructure disadvantages, if not
adequately offset by related increases in fishing income for community residents. In the
interest maintaining stability among fishing communities, it may be appropriate to
consider regional landing restrictions to compensate for infrastructure disadvantages.
Co fishing quotas (CFQ) have been promoted as measures to provide 1
fishing communities with the ability to sustain participation in fisheries post -
rationalization. If a rationalization alternative is chosen that grants recipients the right to
lease or sell their fishery shares, it may be appropriate to allocate some portion of those
fishery shares to communities, to offset the revenues that could be lost to those
communities as the result of such activity. However, if CFQ allocations are not
distributed among communities in accordance with their pre - rationalization level of
10
dependence upon or engagement in the affected fishery, such allocations may actually
exacerbate the adverse affect of rationalization on communities that receive a less than
proportionate distribution, and (ironically) be more inconsistent than consistent with the
dictates of National Standard 8.
There is also a fundamental problem associated with reducing the initial fishery
share allocation to harvesters that are actively participating in the affected fishery in order
to fund an allocation to a CFQ program. In doing so, the CFQ program essentially
displaces those harvesters to benefit the recipient communities, and has a commensurate
adverse effect on the fishing communities in which the displaced vessel owners, skippers
and crew reside. In cases where a strong quasi - property right is awarded to initial
recipients of fishery shares, and it is therefore appropriate to consider a CFQ allocation to
sustain fishing community participation in the fishery, it may be more appropriate to
consider funding the CFQ allocation by attenuating fishing shares at first transfer, rather
than funding the CFQ program `off the top ", in order to avoid this displacement effect.
II. Comparing rationalization models.
The optimum rationalization system appears to be one that promotes efficiency,
adequately addresses the impacts of rationalization on the relationships among vessel
owners, skippers, crew members, processors and fishing communities that flow from
rationalization without unduly impairing efficiency, and preserves the affected fishing
communities' direct and indirect participation in the fishery and the revenues it generates
over the long run. How well do the different rationalization models that have been
developed to date achieve these goals? Are there specific components of those models
that enhance or detract from the effort to achieve these goals? Is there a fishery
rationalization model that has not yet been applied that may be better suited for achieving
these goals than those that have been applied to date?
A. IFQs vs. harvesting cooperatives. There are two fundamentally
different rationalization systems at use in the North Pacific. The first system is based on
an allocation of fishery shares by the government. The halibut and sablefish Individual
Fishing Quota ( "IFQ ") program, under which harvesters receive individual fishery quota
shares from the National Marine Fisheries Service based on their relative catch history
during certain base years, is the prime example of this system. The Bering Sea crab
rationalization system is also built around IFQ allocation.
The second major rationalization system being used in the North Pacific is the
harvesting cooperative alternative. Under this alternative, the government provides the
framework for rationalization by limiting access to the fishery r- i h..1"i g
limited access licenses then negotiate a private rationalization system, and implement that
system through a cooperative membership agreement, which is essentially a contract that
determines each harvester's fishery share The Pacific coast whiting cooperative, the
Alaska scallop cooperative and the Bering Sea pollock catcher /processor cooperative are
examples of this system.
11
Both the IFQ model and the harvesting cooperative model for fishery
rationalization promote efficiency, as both allocate fishery shares, and allow participants
to remove excess capacity, end the race for fish, and pursue improved product rates and
production of higher value products instead of maximizing harvests.
An obvious difference between these two systems has to do with who writes the
rules. Under the IFQ alternative, the government determines the allocation formula,
terms and conditions of quota share holder eligibility, quota usage limits, etc. Under the
cooperative alternative, the range of governmental action can be fairly wide. In the cases
referenced above, the governmental action was limited to establishing a limited access
licensing system, and leaving the rest to be negotiated by the harvesters involved. On the
other hand, in connection with some other harvesting cooperative arrangements (such as
the Bering Sea pollock shore plant catcher vessel cooperatives), the governmental action
is very extensive; it can include facilitating cooperative formation, by allowing a subset
of licensed harvesters to receive a cooperative fishery share, limiting the amount of effort
harvesters in cooperatives can employ in non - rationalized fisheries, and can also include
processor protection measures, such as requiring processor consent for harvester
cooperative formation, or requiring a certain percentage of a cooperative's allocation be
delivered to a certain processor.
Under the harvesting cooperative model, to the extent governmental action is
limited, governmental control is as well. This can result in the most fundamental aspect
of rationalization, the allocation of fishery shares, being held hostage by harvesters (and,
if governmental action conditions cooperative formation on their consent, processors)
who perceive themselves as having a competitive advantage by maintaining a non -
rationalized fishery, and can allow such players to extract ransom (in the form of
extraordinary concessions) from those who need rationalization. It can also result in the
market, rather than public policy, dictating the operational results of rationalization, for
better or for worse. The rapid (and some would say extreme) consolidation experienced
in the 2005 Bristol Bay red King crab fishery is to a large extent an artifact of the absence
of any consolidation limits within the crab harvesting cooperatives, which meant that the
market determined the number of vessels that were employed to prosecute the fishery.
Given these characteristics, if there is a desire to address the interests of skippers,
crewmembers, processors or communities in connection with rationalization, an IFQ
model or a hybrid cooperative model, under which cooperative formation and operation
is to a large degree dependent on complying with governmentally imposed terms and
conditions (as is the case with the American Fisheries Act Bering Sea pollock
cooperatives), may well be preferable.
However, both the traditional IFQ model and the hybrid harvesting cooperative
model award the capital value of fishery shares to initial recipients, and both depend on
the shares being transferred for value by initial recipients to achieve the consolidation.
Together, these characteristics pose fundamental problems for all fishing community
members other than the initial recipients. By doing so, both models create a barrier to
entry to every successive generation of fishery participants, i.e., the barrier of having to
12
acquire capital to acquire fishery shares, as well as all of the other assets necessary to
participate in the fishery. Further, under both models, revenue is transferred out of the
fishery to holders of the fishery shares that are acquired to achieve an efficient level of
consolidation, and the participants who make those payments have an incentive to
recapture them from the revenue stream generated by the fishery. If they do so, and if the
cost associated with consolidation exceeds the gain in value of the fishery resulting from
rationalization, the effect is a transfer of wealth from skippers, crew members and others
who are actively engaged in the fishery to the initial recipients who are bought out.
This leads us to ask — is there a fishery rationalization model that provides the
benefits of rationalization that does not result in the barriers to entry and the
redistribution of fishery revenue that follow from the traditional IFQ model and the
hybrid cooperative model?
B. Toward a new allocation model A good case could be made that the
fundamental problems that rationalization poses for fishing communities do not stem
from the allocation of fishery shares; they stem from the right of the initial recipients to
transfer those shares to others for value. Is it necessary to allow that activity to achieve
the benefits of rationalization? In other words, is it possible to achieve the level of
consolidation necessary to make the fishery efficient without creating a market in fishery
shares?
Consider a system under which the fishery shares are allocated to initial recipients
pro rata, according to their participation in the fishery during certain base years.
However, instead of allowing shares to be transferred by sale or lease, suppose all such
transfers are prohibited, including "stacking" of multiple fishery share allocations on a
single vessel. Instead, assume the system requires that fishery shares be used by
recipients on a unique vessel (either the vessel on which the related catch history was
earned, or a replacement vessel that is not otherwise engaged in the fishery) to remain
valid, and if they are not, they Lapse into the pool of fishery share units. (This is a further
development of the "active participation" system briefly described in the discussion of
allocation versus privatization, above.)
Under this system, society obtains the efficiency gains associated with
rationalization, and harvesters who are engaged in and reliant upon the fishery receive an
income stream that is enhanced accordingly. However, that income stream is now
limited to the period of time they actively participate in the fishery; rationalization no
longer equates to privatization, as the capital value of the fishery, which could be
captured by leasing or selling fishery shares, is not allocated.
A potential weakness of the system is that it does not use the market in fishery
shares to achieve consolidation, as each share recipient has an incentive to remain active
in the fishery in order to maintain his or her share. To that extent, the system introduces
some artificial inefficiency. However, under the rationalization systems that been
implemented to date, there are two classes of initial recipients who typically sell out
immediately rather participate; those who receive a smaller fraction of the fishery than is
13
necessary to participate on an economically successful basis, and those who qualify for
an allocation of fishery shares because they participated during the fishery share
allocation qualifying years, but who have already exited the fishery, either to participate
in other activities, or because they have retired. By definition, those who have received a
fraction of shares too small to support a successful fishing operation would lose money
by re- entering, so it is highly unlikely they will do so. Those who have moved on to
other activities may decide that having an opportunity to fish under rationalization makes
the fishery sufficiently attractive to return, but would have to weigh the incremental gain
in value from rationalization against the direct costs of re -entry (i.e., putting a vessel back
into the fishery, acquiring gear, hiring crew, finding a market, etc.), and would also have
to consider the opportunity costs associated with doing so — what is it they are now doing
that they would have to give up to return to the fishery? It is almost certain that some
recipients in this class would decide not to re- enter.
While neither of these classes is compensated for exiting the fishery, a good
argument could be made that it would have been a questionable policy decision to do so
anyhow, as neither appears to have a reliance interest in the fishery that deserves
compensation. On the other hand, this model provides a benefit to the remainder of those
who rely on or are engaged in the fishery, as they have not been required to transfer
revenue out of the fishery to achieve this first round of consolidation.
Suppose the level of consolidation achieved as a result of this attrition is not
sufficient to produce the most efficient number of participants. Is that a problem? After
all, efficiency is not the only social value we are pursuing. While this model may leave
some excess capacity in the water, it also mitigates the impact of rationalization on the
fishing community that is engaged in and dependent upon the resource. Unless the
amount of that excess capacity is truly problematic, a good argument could be made that
the trade off is worth it.
Further, the cost associated with maintaining that excess capacity depends to a
significant degree on how it is exercised. In the transition from a race for fish to a
rationalized fishery, we can expect that fishery share holders will reduce the investment
made in catching power, and the associated capital and operational costs, and instead
invest in efficient operations, which will increase their profitability. In other words, there
will be an incentive to develop an efficient small boat fishery that uses low cost
harvesting methods, rather than a capital intensive large boat fishery in which fishery
shares are consolidated.
On the other hand, if the capacity likely to remain employed in the fishery after
rationalization appears to be problematic, the simplest method for addressing the issue
would be to make the initial allocation criteria more restrictive. The pre - rationalization
participants who would fail to qualify for fishery shares as a result could be given first
priority status for fishery shares that become available through attrition, as initial
recipients retire from the fishery.
14
Over time, as initial recipients retire out of the fishery, fishery shares will become
concentrated among those who remain. How do we prevent the fishery capacity being
employed from falling below the optimum level, or, in other words, how do we keep the
harvesting capacity employed in the fishery from reaching a level of excessive
consolidation? This could be done by re- opening the fishery share allocation process. If
fishery shares are initially awarded to vessel owners (in recognition of the capital they
have invested and at risk), eligibility for second stage allocations could be based on
participation in the fishery as a skipper or crew member, and a demonstration that the
applicant has the resources available that would be necessary to participate (i.e., vessel,
gear, etc.). This approach would allow fishing opportunities to be passed from generation
to generation, as initial recipients could "vest" their children by giving them the
opportunity to put in the deck and /or wheel house time necessary to qualify for fishery
share allocations, and by passing the vessel and gear necessary to participate in the
fishery on to them. Because there would be no capital cost associated with acquiring the
fishery shares themselves, the second generation would not need to accumulate capital
beyond that necessary to enter a non - rationalized fishery in the first place.
Rather than reallocating on a reactive basis as fishery shares approach
consolidation limits, it may make more sense to schedule regular reviews of the
participation that the fishery can reasonably support, and adjust fishery share
concentration accordingly. This process would be analogous to the optimum number
review currently conducted by the State Commercial Fishery Entry Commission under
the Limited Entry Act, but could be done on an automatic basis rather than being
dependent on a petition from fishery participants.
Interestingly, a rationalization model under which a quota share holder must
actively participate to maintain his or her fishery shares, under which consolidation
results from attrition rather than sales, leasing or "stacking ", and which contains
reasonable consolidation caps which, when reached, result in allocations to new
participants, may well satisfy the Alaska Constitution's least impingement standard. If it
does so, it could be applied as a unitary allocation system that could be implemented in a
fishery that takes place in both State of Alaska and Federal waters.
Obviously, this model would need further development before it could be
implemented. However, it is offered in the interest of providing a contrasting perspective
to the models that have already been employed, and with the hope that it will be
sufficiently attractive to merit further development. Because it does not create the
barriers to entry associated with traditional IFQs and harvesting cooperatives, and does
not award the capital value of the fishery to initial recipients, this model to large extent
addresses the interests of skippers nr crew members. It could incl a vessel use cap, as
referenced above, to preserve a minimum level of skipper and crew employment
opportunities, and which could be adjusted up over time if additional consolidation is
warranted.
This model does not directly address processor interests or the interests of fishing
communities as unique entities as they are affected by rationalization, other than by
15
eliminating the allocation of the capital value of the fishery, and thus eliminating an
equity argument by processors that they should receive a share of that value in the
allocation process. It could easily be adopted to address the processor and community
concern regarding "stranded capital" identified above by including a regional landing
provision.
This model could also be adapted to address the assertion that allocating shares
provides harvesters with increased ex- vessel price negotiation leverage vis -a -vis
processors by conditioning harvesters' ability to use their fishery shares on formation of a
cooperative associated with a processor, with the processor's consent. The American
Fisheries Act inshore pollock cooperative model provides a reasonably good template for
this approach, and is considered by both the harvesters and processors involved to be a
reasonably successful balancing of interests.
Ulmst/documents/City of Kodiak — Gulf Groundfish Rationalization White Paper — 12- 05.doc
16
A RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF KODIAK ADOPTING A
2006 PRIORITIZED FEDERAL CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM LIST
WHEREAS, the City of Kodiak's Comprehensive Capital Improvements Program Plan
identifies the capital improvement needs of the community; and
WHEREAS, the Capital Improvements Program Plan plays a vital role in directing the City
of Kodiak's administration and is utilized as a long -range planning and policy setting tool for City
infrastructure maintenance and enhancement; and
WHEREAS, the City of Kodiak is committed to paying its own way, to the greatest extent
possible, but the cost of some of the City's capital project needs are greater than the resources
available to the City; and
WHEREAS, the Kodiak City Council has identified and prioritized capital improvement
projects for submission to the Alaska Congressional Delegation for funding consideration due to
their significance and/or magnitude.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City ofKodiak, Alaska, that
the following items are considered of primary importance and are hereby adopted as the calendar
year 2006 City of Kodiak federal capital improvement project list:
1. Real Property Trade with the United States Postal Service No Direct $$$ Cost
The United States Postal Service has determined that Kodiak needs a new Post Office. The
City of Kodiak submitted a site proposal, along with others, for the new Post Office. The
United State Postal Service has determined that the property offered by City of Kodiak is the
best site for a new Kodiak Post Office. The City of Kodiak asks for assistance in bringing
about a trade between the City and the United States Postal Service for the selected City land,
with the City receiving the existing Kodiak Post Office building and land in exchange.
2. Replacement Ambulance
It has been a long - standing goal of the City of Kodiak to replace our ambulances every ten
(10) years. Medic II is a 1991 vehicle that has been in service for fifteen years. Medic II
needs to be replaced in order to ensure that the regional ambulance service, operated by the
City of Kodiak, is able to provide an adequate level of response.
CITY OF KODIAK
RESOLUTION NUMBER 05-46
3. Emergency Operations Center $1,500,000
The City of Kodiak and the Kodiak Island Borough do not have a functional Emergency
Resolution No. 05-46
Page 1 of 3
$200,000
Operations Center. The importance of such a facility has become even more apparent as we
have addressed homeland security issues. The City of Kodiak is in the process of designing
a new municipal public safety building that will house the City ofKodiak Police Department,
Regional Jail, Fire Department, Emergency Medical/Ambulance Service, Regional Dispatch
Center, and a purpose -built Regional Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC portion
of the building will cost $1.5 million (about 5% of the total estimated building cost). Due to
our region's high risk for natural disasters, especially earthquakes and tsunamis, and our
potential as a weapons of mass destruction target with the Kodiak Launch Complex - a key
facility of the federal missile defense system - and the largest Coast Guard base in the
country located here, an adequate EOC is essential for the Kodiak community.
4. Baranof Museum $500,000
Cenatnr Stev wac succese in nhtai filndc in the FY`01 omnibus appropriation hill
to pay for some of the structural preservation costs of the Baranof Museum/Erskine House.
The City has, historically, needed to allocate significant funds to maintain this 200 - year -old
Russian building. The building, and the museum collection that it houses, are important
attractions for the community's tourism industry. Unfortunately, the City of Kodiak does not
have an adequate revenue stream to maintain the Erskine House into the future, due to the
loss of tax revenues from the fishing industry and State government. A comprehensive
assessment of the structure has been completed, and the remaining necessary, remedial
improvements are estimated to cost at least $500, 000. These improvements will ensure the
future life and historical integrity of this important building.
5. UV Water Treatment Facility $5,000,000
The federal Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule will require all unfiltered water surface
systems to use a minimum of two disinfectant methods. The City of Kodiak is in the process
of completing a feasibility study of the different treatment methods available. Based on a
number of factors, including our water quality and the federal "disinfection by- products" rule,
preliminary study results indicate that UV disinfection is the most appropriate secondary
water treatment option for the City of Kodiak. This project will provide for site selection,
design, engineering, and construction of a UV disinfection treatment facility for the City's
potable water system. The total estimated cost of this project is on the order of $10 million.
6. Kodiak Water and Sewer System Upgrades $500,000
Large segments of Kodiak's water and sewer system infrastructure are old and dilapidated,
consisting of a significant number of concrete asbestos water lines that are over 40 years old.
The current cost for necessary water and sewer system upgrades exceeds $30 million. The
City has been trying to fund these improvements incrementally, but the magnitude of the
problem puts it beyond the ability of the City and the ratepayers to handle on our own. We
are requesting an appropriation of $500,000, which the City of Kodiak is prepared to match,
allowing us to continue to address these expensive, but necessary system upgrades
Resolution No. 05-46
Page 2 of 3
ATTEST:
i .iLt /714A-4.6
Resolution No 05-46
Page 3 of 3
CITY CLERK
CITY OF KODIAK
l/X1 Z rLv
MAYOR
December 15, 2005
CITY OF KODIAK
RESOLUTION NUMBER 05-47
A RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF KODIAK ADOPTING A
2006 PRIORITIZED STATE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM LIST
WHEREAS, the City of Kodiak% Comprehensive Capital Improvements Program Plan
identifies the capital improvement needs of the community; and
WHEREAS, the Capital Improvements Program Plan plays a vital role in directing the City
of Kodiak's administration and is utilized as a long -range planning and policy setting tool for City
infrastructure maintenance and enhancement; and
WHEREAS, the City of Kodiak is committed to paying its own way, to the greatest extent
possible, but the cost of some of the City's capital project needs are greater than the resources
available to the City; and
WHEREAS, the Kodiak City Council has identified and prioritized capital improvement
projects for submission to the Alaska State Legislature for funding consideration due to their
significance and/or magnitude.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Kodiak, Alaska, that
the following items are considered of primary importance and are hereby adopted as the calendar
year 2006 City of Kodiak state capital improvement project list:
1. Aleutian Homes Water and Sewer Replacement Project $1,500,000
(Phase 1) Willow Street
The Aleutian Homes Subdivision is one of the oldest residential areas in Kodiak, and it is
served by concrete asbestos water pipes that are over fifty years old. Recently, a water line
in this subdivision failed, without any warning, causing significant disruption to residents
and the water system. All of the water and sewer lines in this subdivision need to be replaced.
The cost of replacing the water and sewer lines in the Willow Street right -of -way, where the
failure occurred, is estimated at a total cost of $6 million, with the first phase anticipated to
cost approximately $3 million. The City is asking for funding support for half the cost of this
first phase.
2. Downtown Water and Sewer Replacement Project (Phase 1) $2,000,000
The downtown core of the City of Kodiak is served by concrete asbestos water pipes that are
over forty years old. Recently, a similar type of water line in a nearby subdivision failed
without any warning. Should such a failure occur in the downtown area, it would cause
serious disruption to the City of Kodiak and create an economic crisis. Essentially, all of the
water and sewer lines in the downtown core need to be replaced. The cost of replacing the
water and sewer lines in this first phase, in the vicinity of the "Y" intersection, is anticipated
to cost approximately $4 million. The City is asking for funding support for half the cost of
Resolution No. 05-47
Page 1 of 4
this first phase.
3. Municipal Airport Safety Improvements $700,000
Kodiak Municipal Airport and the Lilly Lake Seaplane Base are valuable community assets,
and the Kodiak City Council has determined that it is in the best interest of the community
to continue the operation of both these facilities with physical improvements that will reduce
aviation risk to the public. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) funding is not available
for the needed improvements, including reconstruction of the Kodiak Municipal Airport
runway. The runway construction alone is estimated to cost $700,000, with total
improvement costs estimated at $1.2 million. The City of Kodiak is requesting State general
fund assistance to partially off -set the cost of these improvements.
4. Community Jail and Juvenile Holding Facility $2,000,000
The Kodiak Jail is the oldest contract jail facility in the State of Alaska, dating back to the
latter part of the 1940's. The facility sits at the waterline of the 1964 tsunami. The 16 -bed
facility is in poor condition due to its age. The jail maintains a steady average of 70%
occupancy. In addition, the current facility cannot be used to hold juveniles. The City is
interested in constructing a new jail facility in conjunction with the construction of a new
multi -use municipal facility. Such an approach will likely reduce the construction cost of the
jail and juvenile hold portions of the building. The City has received a funding commitment
for the facility of $2 million, but the total estimated cost of the jail portion of the new public
safety building is $6 million.
5. Replacement Ambulance $200,000
It has been a long - standing goal of the City of Kodiak to replace our ambulances every ten
(10) years. Medic II is a 1991 vehicle that has been in service for fifteen years Medic II
needs to be replaced in order to ensure that the regional ambulance service, operated by the
City of Kodiak, is able to provide an adequate level of response.
6. Emergency Operations Center $1,500,000
The City of Kodiak and the Kodiak Island Borough do not have a functional Emergency
Operations Center. The importance of such a facility has become even more apparent as we
have addressed homeland security issues. The City of Kodiak is in the process of designing
a new municipal public safety building that will house the City of Kodiak Police Department,
Regional Jail, Fire Department, Emergency Medical/Ambulance Service, Regional Dispatch
Center, and a purpose -built Regional Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The EOC portion
of the building will cost $1.5 million (about 5% of the total estimated building cost). Due to
our region's high risk for natural disasters, especially earthquakes and tsunamis, and our
potential as a weapons of mass destruction target with the Kodiak Launch Complex - a key
facility of the federal missile defense system - and the largest Coast Guard base in the
country located here, an adequate EOC is essential for the Kodiak community.
Resolution No. 05-47
Page 2 of 4
7. Funding Assistance for a New Public Library $1,500,000
The Kodiak public library, which serves the entire Kodiak region and beyond has outgrown
its current building, a building that has reached the end of its useful life. The current
estimated cost of a new public library is approximately $6 million The City of Kodiak is
requesting state funding support for 25% of the estimated cost of the project. The City of
Kodiak hopes to secure grant funding for an additional 25% of the project cost and intends
to pay at least 50% of the project costs with locally generated funds.
8. Leite Addition Subdivision Road Improvements $6,000,000
The Leite Addition Subdivision is an older residential neighborhood in Kodiak, bounded by
Mission Road on the north. While the water and sewer lines in the area have been replaced
in the past, the subdivision is still served by gravel roads that are poorly drained. The entire
neighborhood is in need of road and drainage improvements, including pedestrian amenities.
The estimated cost of completing the road and associated improvements in the neighborhood
is $6 million.
9. Baranof Museum $500,000
Senator Stevens was successful in obtaining funds in the FY'03 Omnibus appropriation bill
to pay for some of the structural preservation costs of the Baranof Museum/Erskine House.
The City has, historically, needed to allocate significant funds to maintain this 200 - year -old
Russian building. The building, and the museum collection that it houses, are important
attractions for the community's tourism industry. Unfortunately, the City of Kodiak does not
have an adequate revenue stream to maintain the Erskine House into the future due to the
loss of tax revenues from the fishing industry and State government. A comprehensive
assessment of the structure has been completed, and the remaining necessary, remedial
improvements are estimated to cost at least $500,000. These improvements will ensure the
future life and historical integrity of this important building.
10. General Fund Grant for the "Y" Intersection Improvements $3,500,000
ADOT has been studying improvements to the "Y" intersection for many years. The oldest
documents in City files indicate that ADOT was investigating alternate designs for the "Y"
as early as 1982. ADOT presented formal design alternatives to the City Council in March
of 1991, fifteen years ago. At that time, construction was tentatively scheduled to begin in
the spring of 1993. At this point, ADOT's best estimate for construction of the "Y" is the
summer of 2008. The City determined that the risk of a catastrophic failure of the utility
mains in the "Y" intersection was unacceptable and has had replacement water and sewer
mains and services designed for the entire "Y" area. The City of Kodiak requested that
ADOT transfer ownership of the project area to the City of Kodiak, along with the funds
needed to rebuild the road and install necessary storm drain improvements. The City's request
was turned down. This capital improvement request is for State general funds to construct
this very important community project.
Resolution No. 05-47
Page 3 of 4
11. UV Water Treatment Facility $5,000,000
The Federal Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule will require all unfiltered water surface
systems to use a minimum of two disinfectant methods. The City of Kodiak is in the process
of completing a feasibility study of the different treatment methods available. Based on a
number of factors, including our water quality and the federal "disinfection by- products" rule,
preliminary study results indicate that UV disinfection is the most appropriate secondary
water treatment option for the City of Kodiak. This project will provide for site selection,
design, engineering, and construction of a UV disinfection treatment facility for the City's
potable water system. The total estimated cost of this project is on the order of $10 million.
ATTEST:
/fti X�t
Resolution No. 05-47
Page 4 of 4
CITY CLERK
CITY OF KODIAK
MAYOR
Adopted: December 15, 2005
KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
RESOLUTION NO. FY2006 -13
Introduced by: Manager Gifford
Requested by: Assembly
Introduced: 10/06/2005
Adopted: 10/06/2005
A RESOLUTION OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH ASSEMBLY ADOPTING A CAPITAL
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006 — 2010
AND ESTABLISHING A CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS PRIORITY UST
WHEREAS, the Kodiak Island Borough represents a community of more than 14,000 people, some of
whom are also citizens of the City of Kodiak, and other incorporated communities located throughout the
Kodiak Island Borough including Larsen Bay, Port Lions, Ouzinkie, Kariuk, Akhiok, and Old Harbon and
WHEREAS, a five -year Capital Improvement Program has been prepared by the Kodiak Island Borough
for fiscal years 2006 through 2010; and
WHEREAS, per Borough code, the Kodiak Island Borough Planning and Zoning Commission has
recommended approval of the prioritized fiscal year 2006 capital improvement priorities at its meeting, in
accordance with Kodiak Island Borough Code 2.40.030E; and
WHEREAS, the Kodiak Island Borough provides for many important roads, services and public
facilities serving the Kodiak Island Borough community, either directly or through service areas and
contracts for construction and maintenance; and
WHEREAS, the Kodiak Island Borough is also served by the State of Alaska which maintains highways,
roads and other public facilities including the Chiniak Highway, the Pasagshak/Narrow Cape Road,
Rezanof Drive, Mill Bay Road, Monashka Bay Road, Antone Larsen Bay Road, etc.; and
WHEREAS, the State of Alaska administers the federal airport improvement program funds for the Kodiak
Airport; and
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
THAT:
Section 1: The Kodiak Island Borough's five (5) year Capital Improvement Program (CIP), for FY
2006 to 2010, priorities are as follow:
KIBSD SEISMIC REPAIRS AND SCHOOL FACILITY PROJECTS
1. Kodiak Middle School Facility Seismic Upgrades $ 1,636,000
2. Kodiak High School Library/Science Lab Seismic Upgrades $ 545,500
3. Ouzinkie School Facility Seismic Upgrades $ 763,700
4. Kodiak High School Gym Non structural wall seismic upgrade $ 109,000
5. Old Harbor School Earthquake Mtigation Project $ 54,550
(drainage) improvements
6. Kodiak Middle School Seismic Retaining Wall replacement $ 54,550
7. North Star Elementary School Drainage Improvement $ 109,100
8. Old Harbor Gym Roof Replacement $ 218,200
9. Larsen Bay Gym and Old Wing Roof Replacement $ 218,200
10. Village Earthquake projects (earth remove! around buildings) $ 327,300
Kodiak Island Borough Alaska Resolution No. FY2008 -13
Page 1 of 4
11. District Wide - Suspended Ceiling Reinforcement
12. District Wide - non - structural improvements (anchoring systems)
13. District Wide - Emergency Generators Plug and Electrical Panel
14. Building Boiler replacement and fuel tank replacement
15. High School Parking Lot Repaving
16. Middle School Access Road Paving
17. Peterson School Parking Lot Paving
18. Main and East Elementary Over & Under Pedestrian Passes
19. North Star Classroom Addition
20. New Kodiak High School
1. Anton Larsen Bay Road Extension to Ice Free Port
2. Sharatin Road Pavement
3. Woodland Acres (3rd -8th Addition) Pavement
4. Lilly Drive Pavement
5. Antone Way Pavement
6. Monashka Bay Boat Ramp & Parking
7. Pasagshak Boat Ramp & Parking
8. Perenosa Drive Construction (600')
1. Mill Bay Beach Access and Recreation Upgrade
2. Island Lake Trail Upgrade
3. Lake Mam/Lake Summitt ATV Trail Improvements
4. White Sands Beach Park Upgrade
5. East Elementary Softball Field Upgrade
6. Bike Path Extensions Study
7. Men's Softball Field
8. All Purpose Field Complex
9. Kodiak Rodeo and State Fairgrounds Improvements
Kodiak Island Borough Alaska
FACILITY PROJECTS
TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS
RECREATION & CULTURE PROJECTS
TOTAL
1 Womens Bay Tsunami Shelter
2. Providence Kodiak Island Medical Clinic (KIB Match)
3. New ADF &G Building Construction and ADF &G term lease paynent
4. Kodiak College Community Vocational Building (Phase I)
8. Chiniak Tsunami Shelter Addition
9. Armory Relocation Plan and Preliminary Design
10. KIB -Admin Building Renovation and Communication System
11. Maritime Museum Feasibility Study
12. Central Solid Waste Transfer Stations Planning & Design
TOTAL
TOTAL
TOTAL
$ 1,636,500
$ 300,000
$ 1,028,290
$ 821,860
$ 1,000,000
$ 48,000
$ 220,000
$ 106,000
$ 3,805,500
$ 67.500.000
$ 80,502,250
$ 636,000
$ 848,000
$ 7,150,000
$ 10,600,000
$ 265,000
$ 265,000
$ 2,517,500
$ 53,000
$ 318.000
$ 22,652,500
$ 21,000,000
$ 300,000
$ 900,000
$ 300,000
$ 250,000
$ 318,000
$ 318,000
$ 100.000
$ 23,486,000
$ 53,000
$ 65,000
$ 23,000.
$ 53,000
$ 25,000
$ 53,000
$ 20,000
$ 825,000
$ 106.000
$ 1,223,000
Resolution No. FY2006 -13
Page 2 of 4
1. Landfill Lateral Expansion Design $ 500,000
2. Landfill Lateral Expansion Construction, Closure & Post Closure $ 6,755,000
3. Baler Building Condition Survey $ 31,000
4. Baler Building Roof Repairs $ 100,000
5. Second Chiniak Tsunami Siren $ 26,500
6. Tsunami Siren Replacement $ 159,000
7. Pasagshak Tsunami Siren $ 53,000
8. Spare Vertical Turbine Pump - KFRC $ 90,000
9. Tanker Truck for Bayside Fire $ 277,000
10. Fire Engine for Bayside Fire $ 265,000
11. Construction and Demolition Shredder $ 265,000
12. Metals Baler $ 265,000
13. Monashka Water $ Sewer Design $ 1.166.000
TOTAL. $ 9,952,500
1. Emergency Communications $ 30,000
2. Tech Services - UPS Upgrade $ 75,000
3. Emergency power to District Server room at KMS $ 174,400
4. Underground Storage Tank Removal - Villages and Town $ 827,000
5. Maintenance: Install Additional Storage Mezzanine $ 470,880
6. Add Storage to back of Building - East Elementary $ 106,820
7. Replace Phone System - East Elementary $ 15,000
8. Replace Phone System - Peterson Elementary $ 18,000
9. Add Parking - East Elementary $ 300,000
10. Install New Fire Suppression in Server Room $ 15,000
11. District Wide Security Video Surveillance, Intrusion $ 100,000
12. Replace Rotten Roof on Bridge Over Playground $ 43,600
13. Replace Rotten Window Sills $ 10,000
14. Replace Kitchen Floor $ 21,800
15. Paint Exterior Of Building - Old Harbor and Akhiok $ 98,100
16. Paint Exposed Membrane on Gym Roof - Middle School $ 13,500
17. Metal Roofing Upgrade - East Elementary $ 38,150
18. Upgrade Crossing Lights /Flashers -Main Elementary $ 18,300
19. Install Crossing Lights /Flashers for Safety on Road - North Star $ 21,800
20. Vehicle Replacement $ 130,000
21. Village Upgrade Energy Lighting - $ 20,000
(Ouankie, Old Harbor, Larsen Bay, Karluk)
22. Town Upgrade Energy Lighting - (East, Peterson, High School) $ 50,000
23. Repair /Re- commission HVAC Equipment - Middle School $ 12,000
24. Vocational Education Equipment Upgrades $ 180,000
25. Technology Upgrades $ 380,000
26. Village Communications IP Phones $ 60,000
27. Fire Alarm Panel Upgrades -(High School, KMS. Auditorium, $ 45,000
East, Karluk)
28. ADA Hearing Impaired Systems District Wide $ 10,000
29. Fire Alarm Magnetic Door Closures - Middle School $ 40,000
30. Fire Alarm Magnetic Door Closures - East Elementary $ 30,000
31. Fire Alarm Magnetic Door Closures - High School $ 60,000
Kodiak Island Borough Alaska
UTILITY & OTHER PROJECTS
KIBSD MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS PROJECTS
Resolution No. FY2006 -13
Page 3 of 4
32. Basketball Court Replacement -Old Harbor $ 21,800
33. Replace Old Wing Roofing - Larsen Bay $ 130,000
34. Floor Finishes in Hallways - Port Lions $ 18,000
35. Replace Floor Finishes Old Wing - Larsen Bay $ 26,160
36. Replace Floor Finishes - East Elementary $ 272,500
37. Floor Finishes - Peterson Elementary $ 272,500
38. Repair, Topcoat and Restripe Parking Lot -High School $ 1,237,172
39. Add Parking - High School $ 250,000
40. Pave Parking and Driveway - Peterson Elementary $ 275,000
41. Repair, Topcoat and Restripe Parking Lot - Middle School $ 45,099
42. Pave Dirt Parking Area - Main Elementary $ 143,880
43. Add Parking and Improve Access - North Star Elementary $ 1,700,000
44. Shelter Storage at each Building $ 250,000
45. Exterior Door Replacement - District Wide $ 41,000
(East, High School, Audit, Main, Karluk, Larsen Bay)
46. Replace Elevator Controls - Middle School $ 48,800
47. Replace Asbestos Siding on Borough Horne - Akhiok $ 23,980
48. Replace Heating Controls - Karluk $ 80,660
49. Interior Finishes (Paint) -Main Elementary $ 98,880
50. Interior Finishes (Paint) -East Elementary $ 103,786
51. Interior Finishes (Paint) - Auditorium $ 167,315
52. Interior and Exterior Finishes (Paint) - Middle School $ 239,000
53. Interior and Exterior Finishes (Paint) - Larsen Bay $ 9,268
54. Interior. Finishes (Paint) - Peterson Elementary $ 119,900
55. Interior Finishes (Paint) -High School $ 348,800
56. Replace Exterior Siding - East Elementary $ 228,900
57. Replace Plumbing Piping - East Elementary $ 31,610
58. Interior Finishes (Paint) - Akhiok $ 33,790
59. Interior and Exterior Finishes (Paint) - Karluk $ 65,520
60. Interior Floor Finishes - Karluk $ 32,700
61. Exterior Window Replacement Old Wing - East Elementary $ 147,150
62. Classroom Furniture - District Wide $ 120,000
63. Gym Floor Replacement - High School $ 175,000
64. Village Playground Replacement $ 220,000
65. Village Teacher Housing - Phase 1 $ 1,000,000
(1 Fourplex and 2 Duplexes in the Villages)
TOTAL $ 11,572,520
section 2: The Kodiak Island Borough administration is hereby instructed to advise the
governor, legislature, and appropriate agencies of the State of Alaska of the Capital
Improvement Program and priorities adopted by the Kodiak Island Borough Assembly.
ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
THIS SIXTH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2005 r-
ATTEST:
cIdL a
Jt ith A. Nielsen, CMC, orough Clerk
Kodiak Island Borough Alaska
s..
Je : me M. Selby, Mayo
Resolution No. FY2006 -13
Page 4 of 4
KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
RESOLUTION NO. FY2006 -15
Introduced by: Manager Gifford
Requested by: Assembly
Introduced: 10/20/2005
Adopted: 10/20/2005
A RESOLUTION OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH ASSEMBLY ADOPTING
A CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006 — 2010
AND ESTABLISHING A RURAL COMMUNITIES
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS PRIORITY LIST
WHEREAS, the Kodiak Island Borough represents a community of more than 14,000 people, some of
whom are also citizens of the City of Kodiak, and other incorporated communities located throughout the
Kodiak Island Borough including Larsen Bay, Port Lions, Ouzinkie, Karluk, Akhiok and Old Harbor, and
WHEREAS, a five -year Capital Improvement Program has been prepared by the Kodiak Island Borough
for fiscal years 2006 through 2010; and
WHEREAS. the Kodiak Island Borough provides for many important roads, services and public
facilities serving the Kodiak Island Borough community, either directly or through service areas and
contracts for construction and maintenance.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
THAT:
Section 1: The Kodiak Island Borough's Rural Communities five (5) year Capital Improvement
Program (CIP), for FY 2006 to 2010, priorities are as follow:
Akhiok
1. Backhoe or Front End Loader $ 50,000
2. Power Stats and Computers $ 40
3. New Generator $ 30,030
TOTAL $ 120,000
Larsen Bay
1. Deep Sea Dock Facility $ 5,000,000
2. Replacement Aggregate for Road System $ 100,000
3. Power plant upgrades $ 1,000,000
4. Rock Screener /Separator $ 75,000
5. Equipment Replacement $ 100,000
TOTAL $ 6,275,000
Old Harbor
1. Hydroelectric Power Project $ 4,500,000
2. Water Tank $ 2,000,000
3. Dock and Harbor Improvements $ 3,000,000
4. Airport Improvements $ 450,000
5. Industrial /Economic Development $ 300,000
6. Multi -use Sports field $ 15,000
7. Maintenance Equipment $ 400,000
TOTAL $ 10,665,000
Kodiak Island Borough Alaska Resolution No. FY2006 -15
Page 1 of 2
Ouzinkie
1. Altemative Energy Wind Generation System $ 250,000
2. Industrial Area Development Replacement Dock $ 5,727,000
3. Heavy Equipment Storage Building $ 250,000
4. Ouzinkie /Kodiak Island Rural Training and Development Center $ 500,000
5. Small Boat Harbor Parking and Access $ 350,000
6. Road Resurfacing, Repair and Rock Crusher $ 3,575,000
7. Landfill Maintenance Equipment $ 100,000
8. Improved Access to Hydro - Electric Plant $ 135,000
9. Fire Hydrant Replacement and Addition $ 100,000
10. Tourism, Recreational and Economic Development $ 100,000
11. John Deere Tractor with Backhoe $ 135,000
TOTAL $ 11,222,000
Port Lions
1. Public Dock Facility $ 5,000,000
2. Water Plant Upgrade $ 669,000
3. City Large Equipment $ 1,150,000
4. Solid Waste Disposal Site $ 350,000
5. Harbor Water Main $ 750,000
6. Road Upgrades and Extension $ 1,150,000
7. Public Safety Building $ 800,000
8. Maintenance Improvement Facility $ 100,000
9. Harbor Building $ 75,000
10. Municipal Building $ 250,000
11. Search and Rescue Skiff & Truck $ 100,000
12. New Subdivision $ 400,000
13. Outer Breakwater Stub $ 3,000,000
14. Boat Storage /Dry Dock Facility $ 650,000
15. Cold Storage Facility $ 250,000
TOTAL $ 14,694,000
Section 2: The Kodiak Island Borough administration is hereby instructed to advise the governor,
legislature, and appropriate agencies of the State of Alaska of the Capital
Improvement Program and priorities adopted by the Kodiak Island Borough Assembly.
ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY OF THE KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
THIS TWENTIETH DAY OF OCTOBER 2005
KODIAK ISLAND BOROUGH
ATTEST: J me M. Selby, Mayor
d ith A. Nielsen,
Kodiak Island Borough Alaska
P "nap
„ Borough Clerk
Resolution No. FY2006 -15
Page 2 of 2
Mini - exercise abstracts - Draft
Public Information Officer
January 20 — 9:00 am to 2:00 pm
Recommended participants: Personnel designated by an agency or organization to act as the
information officer, executive administrative staffs who may be answering calls from the public or
stakeholders during the initial phases of a disaster.
Exercise objectives:
• Review basic ICS systems and structure
• Review role of the PIO as an agency representative and member of an IMT
• Effective disaster communications
• Using web sites, phone trees and other technologies
• Needs of the community versus needs of the media
• Identifying key stakeholders and special interest groups
• Communicating with special needs groups
• Develop a pre- exercise communications plan to inform the community of the goals of the
exercise, what might be happening and establish a hotline or other means on the day of the
exercise for people to get information.
Finance Section
January 27 — 8:30 am to 11:30 am
Recommended participants: organization finance officers (CFO), purchasing officers, senior
accountants, grant administrators, accounting staff. May also include executives of organizations who
would have the authority to implement emergency procurement procedures or move funds.
Exercise objectives:
• Review basic ICS systems and structure
• Review role of the finance section
• Develop a cost accountability process between the city and borough and other non-
governmental agencies in the community.
• Develop a joint procurement process
• Identify obstacles to joint procurement, accounting, funding for later resolution.
• Establish a disaster accounting system for all agencies
• Define for city and borough who has emergency procurement authority and limits.
Logistics Section
January 27 — 12:30 pm to 3:30 pm
Recommended participants: agency purchasing staff, finance staff, personnel who will serve as
support roles (communications, feeding, supply, transportation).
Q
Community Exercise Schedule January — March 2006 Page 1 of 3
Exercise objectives:
• Review of basic ICS systems and structure
• Review role of logistics section
• Develop ordering system and tracking
• Integrate ordering process with resource tracking needs in Planning Section
• Identify key community resources for support functions and activities
• Develop EOC activation procedures and needs
• Knowledge of how to access the SECC for state and other outside resources
Incident Commander and Command Staff Exercise
February 10 — 9:00 am to 3:00 pm
Recommended participants: Senior executive staff who may be in the position of incident commander
or staffing the safety, liaison, legal or PIO functions. Potential participants may also include key
community agency executives from such areas as the hospital, school district, Red Cross, industry.
Exercise objectives:
• Review of basic ICS systems and structure
• Understanding of the role and responsibility of the incident commander
• Understanding of the roles of the safety officer, liaison officer, PIO and legal officer.
• Ability to work within a Unified Command structure that may involve local, state, federal and
private organizations.
• Ability to develop clear incident objectives and direction
• Ability to manage a team system made up of diverse agencies and knowledge levels.
• Develop process for local disaster declarations
• Develop understanding of the role of the legal officer to the team
Elected and Appointed Officials Exercise
February 7 or 14 — 6:00 pm to 9:00 pm
Recommended participants: City Council members, Borough Assembly members, mayors,
school board members, municipal attorney, clerk, City and Borough manager.
Exercise objectives:
• Understanding basics of ICS systems
• Understand the role of the elected body during a disaster
• Understand the role of the Multi - Agency Coordination Group
• Understand the need for and process for emergency meetings, ratification of local disaster
declarations.
• Develop an understanding of the role local stakeholders and interested parties have
during a disaster.
Community Exercise Schedule
January — March 2006 Page 2 of 3
Operations Section Exercise
February 15 — 9:00 am to 3:00 pm
Recommended participants: Members of local emergency services, public works, hospital, school
district, harbor Red Cross or other agency who may have significant role in the tactical responses
during a disaster. May also consider local cannery managers, fuel depot manager and similar local
businesses.
Exercise objectives:
• Review basics of ICS systems
• Understand the role of the operations section
• Know how to manage the section using branches, divisions, groups, task forces or strike teams.
• Understand the specific role law enforcement may have during operations.
• Be able to develop an operational plan based on incident objectives, create division
assignments and tasks for next operational period.
• Understand the ordering process, coordination links to logistics and planning.
• Be able to assist in the development of the ICS 215 planning worksheet and the ICS 204
division assignment form.
• Be able to integrate safety planning and tactics into all phases of operations.
• Understand the potential role of state and federal law enforcement agencies.
Planning Section Exercise
February 24 — 9:00 am to 3:00 pm
Recommended participants: staff of city and borough planning departments, GIS technicians, staff who
may work with environmental permitting or planning, staff who would fill positions in resource or
situation units, may also consider local ADEC staff, fish and wildlife staff, people who might provide
specific technical expertise during a disaster.
Exercise Objectives:
• Review basics of ICS systems
• Understand the role and responsibilities of the planning section and its sub units
• Be able to implement a daily planning cycle, manage meetings and maintain team schedules
• Be able to develop a resource tracking system
• Develop the planning worksheet, coordinate resource haves and needs and relay those to the
operations section.
• Understand the basic components of an Incident Action Plan, who produces each work product
and how to coordinate the final plan package for approval by the unified command.
• Understand the needs for a demobilization plan and who assists in developing the plan
March 13,2006: Exercise set up, EOC set up, final participant meeting
March 14,2006: Community Exercise - 9:00 am to 5.00pm
March 15,2006: Exercise debriefing and participant evaluation — 9:00 am to 11:00 am
Evaluation team and KIB staff meeting — 11:00 am to 12:30 pm
Community Exercise Schedule January — March 2006
Page 3 of 3
Freed, Linda
From: Kodiak Historical Society [baranov @ak.net]
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2005 1:00 PM
To: Freed, Linda
Cc: mogle @kib.co.kodiak.ak.us
Subject: CLG Program
I spoke last week with Alaska SHPO Judy Bitmer about the Certified Local Government Program. I asked her about the
possibility and process of filing jointly, and the drafting of an ordinance. She said that the City and the Borough may go
through the certification process together and share a historic preservation commission. Each government must adopt an
ordinance and incorporate an acknowledgment of the historic preservation commission into their codes. In Fairbanks, the
City govemment defers mostly to the Borough, as the Borough is the larger land -owner and the agency through which
property records are held. Governments can apply for grants together or separately, so long as there is consistency in the use
of the commission.
She also said that the preservation plan does not have to be complete at the time of CLG application. It is only necessary to
state that government code grants the commission the authority to write a preservation plan and that the commission intends
to do so. Likewise with the inventory of cultural and historic resources - it is suitable to submit a preliminary list, augmented
by a statement such as, "These are the resources that we know of in our community and we are drafting a preservation plan
that will make possible the identification of additional resources." It is worthwhile to note that for the past three years, the #1
CLG grant priority listed by the Alaska Historical Commission is for "projects that update plans, review existing ordinances
and create local registers."
I've downloaded copies of ordinances from Fairbanks, Ketchikan and Sitka that deal with the local historic preservation
commissions, and have attached them here. There is similar language in all with regards to the powers & duties of the
commission, but also considerable variation (i.e. Fairbanks deals with "historic districts" and also includes punitive measures
for violators) Judy has asked Doug Gasek, State Architectural Historian, to work with us in drafting an ordinance that fits
Kodiak's needs. Please let me know your thoughts.
Happy Holidays, Katie
I've attached the Xmas photo too - couldn't help myself.
Katie O. Parker
Director
Kodiak Historical Society
Baranov Museum
101 Marine Way
Kodiak AK 99615
tel (907) 486 -5920
fax (907) 486 -3166
www.baranov.us
12/23/2005
Page 1 of 1
Alaska Certified Local Government Historic Preservation Program
Introduction
Historic buildings in a neighborhood are the framework for the memories, values, and history of a
community. Poorly planned construction such as parking lots, highways, or housing developments
fragment a neighborhood, and its sense of community, its cohesiveness, and its past are destroyed.
The residents, among them those who work and live in the historic homes and neighborhoods, see
the effects of alterations to the buildings. They enjoy the economic and social benefits that
preservation and rehabilitation of historic properties brings.
The National Historic Preservation Act established the Certified Local Government Program to
provide financial and technical assistance for preservation of historic resources at the local level.
To participate in the program, a local government needs to establish a historical preservation
commission and a program meeting state and federal standards. Once the State Historic
Preservation Officer (SHPO) and the National Park Service (NPS) determine these are in place,
then the government can request to be certified and participate in the program as a Certified Local
Government (CLG).
Ten percent of annual Historic Preservation Fund (HPF) appropriations made to the states under
the National Historic Preservation Act must be passed to CLGs through the SHPO office. In
Alaska this is done through grants. Various kinds of projects can be funded. These include
nomination of a historic property to the National Register of Historic Places, survey and inventory
of historic and archaeological resources, preparation of preservation plans, staff support for a local
historic preservation commission, historic structure reports, archaeological testing of sites to
determine their significance, and development of public education preservation programs.
Technical assistance, training in historic preservation goals and programs, and guidance on how to
conduct specific projects are available through the SHPO office.
Thirteen communities in Alaska, from Ketchikan to Barrow, had become CLGs by 2003. The first
were certified in 1986. Between 1986 and 2001 Alaska CLGs conducted 88 projects and received
$678,069 in federal historic preservation funds for their programs. Projects have included
neighborhood surveys in Juneau and Dillingham; archaeological testing in the Matanuska - Susitna
Borough; preservation planning in Fairbanks and the North Slope Borough; creation of inventories
in Sitka, Unalaska, Kenai and Anchorage; National Register documentation in Ketchikan; and
public education programs in Seward, Cordova and Juneau.
This package has the state guidelines and application to become a CLG. Supplemental program
information is available from the Alaska Office of History and Archaeology. In Alaska, the SHPO
is in this office.